The Second Treaty of Paris Is Signed: November 20, 1815
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This text comes from our book, Light to the Nations, Part II.
Throughout the winter of 1815, the Congress of Vienna had continued its work, despite the return of Napoleon. By June 9, 1815, nine days before Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, the Congress had signed its “Final Act”—its settlement for Europe. At the heart of this agreement was Metternich’s goal that the boundaries of the European states should, as far as possible, return to what they had been before the French Revolution. The agreement also kept Europe’s dynasties in place—especially Austria’s Habsburg dynasty, which had become the greatest ruling house in Europe.
Among its other acts, the Congress of Vienna restored the Bourbon king, Fernando VII, to the throne of Spain. It returned the Kingdom of Naples to Fernando IV of Sicily, who now styled himself King Fernando I of the “Two Sicilies.” (During the 100 Days, King Joachim Murat had abandoned the allies for Napoleon. In May, the Austrians forced him to flee to France, where he was captured and executed after the Battle of Waterloo.) The Congress returned Piedmont, along with the Republic of Genoa, to King Vittorio Emanuele I (Victor Emmanuel I) of Sardinia. Through the diplomacy of Cardinal Consalvi, Pope Pius VII regained most of the lands the Papal States had once lost to the French republic and empire.
Prussia, too, benefited from the Congress of Vienna. The German territories that Napoleon had taken were restored to King Friedrich Wilhelm. Furthermore, Prussia obtained new lands, including a large portion of Saxony, all of Westphalia, and most of the Rhineland. Austria regained all the lands she had possessed in 1763, except for the Netherlands. But in payment for the Netherlands, Austria received the Italian regions of Lombardy and Venice.
The Congress did not restore the Holy Roman Empire to Emperor Franz, but it did allow Austria to take a leading role in what was called the German Confederation. The confederation was a loose alliance of 38 German states, including Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and Württemberg. Each state kept its sovereignty, though it could not make war against other members of the confederation or conclude private treaties with foreign powers. Such common interests were given over to a common assembly, or diet, to which the states sent deputies. Yet, in this diet, the states did not have equal voting power. Austria had 17 votes out of 69, while Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Hanover, and Württemberg had only four votes each. Other states had even fewer votes. The confederation’s constitution made it difficult for the diet to pass laws, and this allowed Austria, with her large vote advantage, to dominate the assembly—just as Metternich had wanted.
France and the major powers agreed to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna in the second Treaty of Paris, signed on November 20, 1815. The treaty was harsher toward France than the 1814 Treaty of Paris had been. Louis XVIII was recognized as king, but he had to give up more territories to the allies. He had to pay an indemnity of 700 million francs, and for five years he had to pay for 150,000 troops sent by foreign governments into France as an army of occupation. The treaty rejected the reforms made by France’s revolutionary governments and restored the first revolutionary French constitution—the Constitution of 1791.
In a separate treaty signed the same day as the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia formed the Quadruple Alliance. The alliance’s task was to maintain peace in Europe by making sure that all European nations obeyed the decisions of the Congress of Vienna. The alliance was another triumph for Prince Metternich, for it gave the ancient regime a club to beat down revolution anywhere it reared its head. Metternich would soon seek to give the alliance even greater powers.
At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich had worked to make sure that Russia did not grow too powerful and that she remained Austria’s friend. For this reason, he agreed to Tsar Aleksandr’s demand—that the Congress not give independence to Poland. And Metternich allowed the tsar to have his way in another matter. Orthodox though he was, Aleksandr had come under the influence of Pietist Protestant Christians and had come to think that Christian ideals of justice, charity, brotherhood, and peace should guide the decisions of rulers. What Aleksandr meant by these ideals was not entirely clear, but in September 1815 he was able to convince Prussia and Austria to join a Holy Alliance as a way of making sure the Quadruple Alliance operated according to Christian ideals.
Most of the countries of Europe eventually joined Aleksandr’s Holy Alliance. Pope Pius VII, however, would not—because, he said, it was wrong for both the Church and Catholic states to enter a religious union with “heretics” (Protestants) and “schismatics” (Orthodox). Too, if the pope signed on to the alliance, he would be forced to halt the Holy Office’s work of protecting the purity of Catholic teaching and abandon excommunication. Great Britain also did not join the alliance because Prince George, who now was regent for the insane George III, thought it foolish. Other members of the Holy Alliance shared the prince’s opinion, including Metternich. Indeed, only Tsar Aleksandr took the alliance seriously.
Yet, as part of Metternich’s Concert of Europe, Aleksandr’s Holy Alliance became one of the chief guiding forces of European life in the first half of the 19th century. It gave a kind of religious character to Metternich’s attempts to preserve the ancient regime of Europe and to suppress democracy and the growing movements for nationalism and social justice. Liberals came to hate the Holy Alliance perhaps even more than the Quadruple Alliance. The Holy Alliance, they thought, was a dishonest use of religion to cover up oppression and undermine freedom.
The defeat of revolutionary, imperial France and the formation of the Quadruple and Holy Alliances had proven that Metternich was as skillful at diplomacy as Napoleon had been at warfare. Until at least the 1830s, it was to be Klemens, Prince von Metternich, and his policies that guided the life of Europe.
